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Abstract
When the guns of war fell silent in 1865, Americans throughout the reunited states grappled with the logistics
of peace. At virtually every turn lay nebulous but critical questions of race, class, allegiance, and identity. More
pragmatic legal stumbling blocks could also be found strewn across the path to Reconstruction; some of them
would ensnare the healing nation for decades to come. Among their number was notorious Supreme Court
decision United States v. Klein (1872). Born on July 22, 1865 out of a small debate over the wartime seizure of
Vicksburg cotton stores, Klein quickly evolved into a legal behemoth. In its tangles with the separation of
powers, the presidential power of pardon, and the supremacy of the executive in judicial matters, United States
v. Klein would ultimately amount to the very poster child of the snowball effect at work in Reconstruction law.
Widely forgotten or overlooked today, the decision of United States v. Klein nonetheless stands as one of the
most crucial battles of the American Civil War era.
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COTTON, CLEMENCY, AND CONTROL:  
UNITED STATES V. KLEIN AND THE JURIDICAL 
LEGACY OF EXECUTIVE PARDON 
  
Heather Clancy 
 
 On January 29, 1872, Chief Justice Salmon Portland 
Chase rose from the bench to deliver one of his final 
Supreme Court majority opinions.1 Flanked by the white 
columns and red backdrop of the court chamber on that 
January day, Chase peered out from under bushy white 
brows to solemnly address his audience.  For several tense 
minutes he intoned the court’s ruling until finally concluding 
tersely that sometimes brevity is the most appropriate 
rhetorical choice and coming to a concise close. By the time 
that Chase took his seat again, the aging justice had played 
his part in deciding one of the most charged moments in 
American legal history. Despite its humble origins as a 
wartime compensation claim dispute over cotton, this 7-2 
Supreme Court decision of United States v. Klein would 
come to strongly reinforce the separation of powers, 
crippling a congressional statute intended to limit 
presidential pardoning clout and reaffirming the supremacy 
                                                 
1 Chase would spend his last day as Supreme Court Justice 
hardly more than a year later, dying suddenly in New York on 
May 7, 1873 at the age of 65. A writer for the San Francisco 
Daily Evening Bulletin sang Chase’s praises on the evening of 
his passing, remarking that although the Chief Justice had been 
plagued by “broken health” in his later years, he nonetheless 
stood as “an upright Judge, and a statesman who has become 
illustrious in the history of his country.” 
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of the executive in judicial matters. Thus was offered one of 
the most overlooked but critical legal verdicts of the 
American Civil War era. 
The story of United States v. Klein begins nearly a 
decade before its conclusion, with the passage of Congress’s 
Abandoned and Captured Property Act of March 12, 1863. 
As extended by a second act on July 2, 1864, the legislation 
“authorized a recovery in the court of claims for the proceeds 
of property captured and sold by the military authorities 
without judicial condemnation after July 17, 1862, and 
before March 12, 1863.”2 In passing the act, Congress 
enabled owners of property that had been seized in the 
course of the war to claim whatever proceeds had been 
gained from the sale of the confiscated property.3 John A. 
                                                 
2 This summary of the Abandoned and Captured Properties Act 
can be found under the General Index entry for the act in United 
States Supreme Court,  United States Supreme Court Reports, 
Volumes 98-101 (Rochester, NY: The Lawyers Co-Operative 
Publishing Company, 1901), 1087. 
3 “1. Under [the Abandoned and Captured Properties Act] a party 
preferring his claim in the Court of Claims, need not, where he 
has purchased in good faith, prove the loyalty of the person from 
whom he bought the property whose proceeds he claims. . . . 
    2. The vendor is a competent witness to support the claimant’s 
case, if he never had any claim or right against the government, 
and is not interested in the suit. . . . 
    3. In a claim under this act, the Court of Claims may render 
judgment for a specific sum as due to the claimant. 
    4. Claimants under the act are not deprived of its benefits 
because of aid and comfort not voluntarily given to the rebellion.  
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Klein, acting administrator for the estate of Vicksburg 
Collector of Customs Victor F. Wilson, would act in 
accordance with the passing of the new act when he applied 
in the Court of Claims for proceeds owed Wilson “for cotton 
and interest due . . . and for refund of duties and internal-
revenue tax.”4 The 664 bales of cotton in question 
(amounting to $125,300 USD in claims) had been seized 
from Wilson’s warehouse by Confederate troops in the 
summer of 1863 during Grant’s siege of Vicksburg.5 The 
                                                 
    5. But voluntarily executing, even through motives of personal 
friendship, the official bonds of quartermasters or commissaries 
of the rebel army, was giving such aid and comfort. . . . 
    6. The mere taking possession of a city by the government 
forces was not a ‘capture’ of all the cotton in it, within the 
meaning of the act.”  
United States Supreme Court, Cases Argued and Adjudged in 
The Supreme Court of the United States, December Term, 1869 
(Washington, DC: William H. Morrison, 1870), 817. 
4 Victor F. Wilson died intestate—without a will—on July 22, 
1865, only a few short weeks after the last Confederate troops 
surrendered to Union forces. Wilson would be survived by his 
widow Jane Wilson (d. 1878) and his children Ann Wilson, Jane 
“Jeanie” Wilson, Ellen Wilson, Victor F. Wilson, Jr., Catherine 
Wilson, and Robert Wilson. United States Supreme Court, 
“United States, Appt., v. John A. Klein, Surviving Admr. of 
Victor F. Wilson, Deceased” in United States Supreme Court 
Reports, Volumes 78-81 (Rochester, NY: E.R. Andrews Printing 
Company, 1912), 519-527. Victor F. Wilson family information 
courtesy of Ancestry.com 
5 This sum of $125,300 would amount to more than $2.36 
million today once adjusted for inflation. (Calculation curtesy of 
“Inflation Calculator,” http://www.davemanuel.com/inflation-
calculator.php.) 
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troops then took the cotton and “without his license or 
consent” relocated it to “the various defenses of the town, to 
protect it [the cotton] against the approaches and assaults of 
the Union army.”6  
The Confederate plan backfired, however, and the 
bales were discovered and subsequently sold by the 
victorious Union forces, with proceeds from the sales going 
to the United States Treasury. The situation was further 
complicated with a development on December 8, 1863, 
when President Abraham Lincoln issued a proclamation 
offering pardon to any individual who had supported or 
fought for the so-called Confederate States of America—
including full restoration of property rights—so long as the 
individual was able and willing to take the oath of allegiance 
to the United States.7 Victor F. Wilson would take eager 
advantage of this offer, taking the oath of allegiance only 
weeks later on February 15, 1864. After the war ended, Klein 
submitted a claim for the 664 bales of cotton to the Court of 
Claims on December 26, 1865. In 1866 the suit was brought 
before the court for $125,300, at which time the court ruled 
in favor of Wilson’s estate.8  
                                                 
6 United States Supreme Court, Digest of the United States 
Supreme Court Reports: U. S. vols. 1-206 (Rochester, NY: 
Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Co., 1908), 3. 
7 Dictionary.Law.com defines an executive pardon as using “the 
executive power of a Governor or President to forgive a person 
convicted of a crime, thus removing any remaining penalties or 
punishments and preventing any new prosecution of the person 
for the crime for which the pardon was given.” 
8 United States Supreme Court, “United States, Appt., v. John A. 
Klein, Surviving Admr. of Victor F. Wilson, Deceased,” United 
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It was only later revealed that Wilson had received 
surety—guarantee of imbursement—in the form of two 
Confederate bonds, one signed on August 11, 1862 for 
brigade quartermaster John H. Crump and the other in 1863 
for an assistant commissary. This acceptance of Confederate 
bonds was a development that brought the sincerity of 
Wilson’s 1864 oath of allegiance into question. The court 
ruled that Klein himself “did give aid and comfort to the 
rebellion and the persons engaged therein, and did not at all 
times consistently adhere to the United States.” The ruling 
did state, however, that Wilson’s children were minors 
during the war and “never gave comfort to the rebellion.” 
Wilson, likewise, “did adhere to the United States” during 
the period in question, his pardon having “[relieved] him 
from any charge of disloyalty on account of his having 
become surety.” On May 26, 1869, the Court of Claims ruled 
that Wilson’s estate was entitled to receive the full $125,300 
and so decreed the entirety of the amount to Klein to 
administer to Wilson’s estate. 9 
                                                 
States Supreme Court Reports, Volumes 78-81 (Rochester, NY: 
E.R. Andrews Printing Company, 1912), 519-527. 
9 Readers may find it intriguing to learn that the case of the 664 
bales of stolen cotton was not the first of Wilson’s wartime 
misfortunes. On September 5, 1862, it was reported in the 
Vicksburg Evening Citizen that previous day’s shelling of the 
city and its port had resulted in a shell striking Wilson’s 
residence. The shell “entered the northwest corner [of the house], 
and from thence to the cellar, where it exploded, tearing things to 
pieces generally, and coming out at the top of the building.” 
United States House of Representatives, “Claims Arising Under 
the Captured and Abandoned Property Act” in United States 
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 On April 30, 1870 the Supreme Court would decide 
a parallel case to United States v. Klein in the form of United 
States v. Padelford. Like Klein, Edward Padelford had 
abandoned his stores of cotton due to wartime chaos and 
“having participated in the rebellion had taken the amnesty 
oath.” He then approached the Court of Claims in the hopes 
of regaining the value of his lost cotton. The court ruled that 
Padelford’s swearing of the oath of allegiance to secure the 
presidential pardon had effectively negated his participation 
in the late rebellion, making him eligible to claim the value 
of his lost cotton. Lawyers representing the United States 
then appealed the Padelford case before the Supreme Court, 
only to be defeated again by the powerful presidential 
                                                 
Congressional Serial Set, Issue 3269 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1894), 2; United States Supreme 
Court, “United States, Appt., v. John A. Klein, Surviving Admr. 
of Victor F. Wilson, Deceased” in United States Supreme Court 
Reports, Volumes 78-81 (Rochester, NY: E.R. Andrews Printing 
Company, 1912), 520; United States Court of Claims, Reports 
from the Court of Claims Submitted to the House of 
Representatives, Volume 12 (Washington, DC: W.H. and O.H. 
Morrison Law Books Publishers, 1877), 729; Charles C. Nott 
and Samuel H. Huntington, Cases Decided in the Court of 
Claims of the United States at the December Term 1871; and the 
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in All the 
Appealed Cases from 1865 to May 1872 (Washington, DC: W.H. 
and O.H. Morrison Law Books Publishers, 1873), vii-viii; The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, “Appointments, etc.,” June 23, 1865; 
United States Supreme Court, “United States v. Klein” [80 U.S. 
128 (1872)], in United States Reports: Cases Adjudged in the 
Supreme Court, Volume 80 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1872), 132. 
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pardon. Ultimately, the Supreme Court would rule in the 
favor of Edward Padelford, affirming the Court of Claims 
decision.10  
 Three months after the decision of United States v. 
Padelford, on July 12, 1870 the progression of United States 
v. Klein would be forced to diverge significantly from United 
States v. Padelford’s trajectory when Congress passed what 
became known at the time as the Drake proviso to the 
General Appropriations Act of 1870, prohibiting the use of 
a presidential pardon in applying for sale proceeds in the 
Court of Claims:  
 
Provided, That no pardon or amnesty granted 
by the President, whether general or special, 
by proclamation or otherwise, nor any 
acceptance of such pardon or amnesty, nor 
oath taken, or other act performed in 
pursuance or as a condition thereof, shall be 
admissible in evidence on the part of any 
claimant in the Court of Claims as evidence 
                                                 
10 United States Supreme Court, “United States v. Klein” [80 
U.S. 128 (1872)] in United States Reports, 132, 143; United 
States Supreme Court, “United States v. Padelford” [76 U.S. 531 
(1869)]. 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/76/531/case.html; 
United States Supreme Court, The Supreme Court Reporter, 
Volume 15 (St. Louis: West Publishing Co, 1895), 170; The 
Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art, “The 
President and Congress,” December 22, 1866. Published in The 
Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art Volume 
22 (London: Spottiswoode and Co., 1866). 
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in support of any claim against the United 
States, or to establish the standing of any 
claimant in said court, or his right to bring or 
maintain suit therein… 
 
Furthermore, Republican Missouri Senator Charles D. 
Drake’s proviso asserted that acceptance of such a pardon 
amounted to evidence that the pardoned individual did in 
fact provide support to the Confederacy and was therefore 
ineligible to recover sale proceeds. By even requesting a 
pardon, the Drake proviso claimed, an individual admitted 
his own guilt. As a result, Wilson’s acceptance of Lincoln’s 
pardon in 1862 would be reason enough to categorize 
Wilson’s estate as ineligible to receive the proceeds from the 
sale of the 664 bales of cotton seized in Vicksburg. The 
ripples of this kind of ex post facto presidential pardon 
limitation had chafed public opinion as far away as Britain, 
with one British journalist calling such legislation “a 
revolutionary measure, and the retrospective effect of the 
change [a] violation of natural justice.” On the basis of the 
new 1870 statute, the United States government appealed the 
increasingly convoluted claims case to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court then accepted United States v. Klein to 
be the seventeenth of almost forty for review and trial during 
that session, setting the date for its argument as April 21, 
1871, only to be held under advisement until October of the 
same year.11 
                                                 
11 United States Supreme Court, “United States v. Klein” [80 
U.S. 128 (1872)], in United States Reports, 133; “The President 
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 On January 29, 1872, nearly a full seven years after 
the Civil War’s conclusion, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of John A. Klein and by extension the estate 
of the late Victor F. Wilson. When Chief Justice Chase rose 
and delivered the court’s opinion, he not only ruled in favor 
of Klein and Wilson but also in favor of the presidency’s 
executive pardoning power. The court ruled both that the 
General Appropriations Act of 1870’s Drake proviso was 
unconstitutional and that Congress had exceeded its 
constitutionally-allotted legislative power by attempting to 
dictate a judicial branch decision. Furthermore, the court 
ruled that Congress had also encroached on the executive 
branch’s domain in passing a statute intended to restrict the 
power of the executive’s constitutional pardoning power. In 
an opinion delivered by T.D. Lincoln, J.M. Carlisle, and 
others on behalf of the appellee that was later recorded in 
Volume 80 of the Supreme Court Reports, it was forcefully 
asserted that “If [the president’s] acts are liable to be 
controlled, modified, annulled, or defeated by Congress, the 
division of powers in this government is a chimera and a 
delusion.”12 Their sentiments are echoed perfectly in an 
                                                 
and Congress,” The Saturday Review [London], December 22, 
1866; “Washington,” The New York Herald, April 24, 1871; 
“Constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill,” The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, April 28, 1871. 
12 Justices Samuel F. Miller and Joseph P. Bradley opposed the 
majority opinion in United States v. Klein. Presenting the 
dissenting opinion for the two was Miller, who argued that the 
key issue at hand was that the Supreme Court honor the original 
intent of the Abandoned and Captured Property Act: “to restore 
the proceeds of such property to the loyal citizen, and to transfer 
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Atlanta Daily Sun article of March 8, 1873 that utilized the 
language of abolition when it forcefully maintained that 
“This power to grant pardon and amnesty is vested by the 
Constitution in the President alone. It cannot be fettered by 
legislation.” The volatility of sentiment regarding the case 
held by those involved in and monitoring its progress simply 
cannot be overlooked. 13 
 Press coverage of United States v. Klein was as 
diverse and spirited in opinion as that surrounding the 
question of presidential pardon. One article originally 
printed in The New York World was reprinted in Atlanta on 
March 14, 1872. In it, the author reflected on the decision’s 
relationship with the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, 
adopted several years earlier on July 9, 1868. In the view of 
the New York World author, the wording of the amendment’s 
                                                 
it absolutely to the government in the case of those who had 
given active support to the Rebellion. . . . Can it be inferred from 
anything found in the statute that Congress intended that this 
property should ever be restored to the disloyal? I am unable to 
discern any such intent.” For Justice Miller, the question of 
Wilson’s loyalty was laid to rest by Wilson’s traitorous 
acceptance of Confederate bonds. United States Supreme Court, 
“United States, Appt., v. John A. Klein, Surviving Admr. of 
Victor F. Wilson, Deceased”, 521; United States Supreme Court 
Reports, Volumes 78-81 (Rochester, NY: E.R. Andrews Printing 
Company, 1912), 526-527. 
13 United States Supreme Court, “United States, Appt., v. John 
A. Klein, Surviving Admr. of Victor F. Wilson, Deceased”, 521; 
United States Supreme Court Reports, Volumes 78-81 
(Rochester, NY: E.R. Andrews Printing Company, 1912), 521; 
The Atlanta Daily Sun, “The Morrill Amendment, Speech of 
Rep. Erasmus W. Beck, of Georgia” March 8, 1873. 
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third section proves convoluted in light of the United States 
v. Klein ruling. That third section reads as follows: 
 
No person shall be a Senator or 
Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President or Vice-President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United 
States, or under any State, who, having 
previously taken an oath, as a member of 
Congress, or as an officer of the United 
States, or as a member of any State 
legislature, or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the 
Constitution of the United States, shall have 
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against 
the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote 
of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
 
When read alongside the majority opinion of United States 
v. Klein, the journalist argued, it might be interpreted that 
prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, “all 
citizens were eligible to office, even though they might have 
participated in insurrection or rebellion, but that with the 
adoption of the amendment such classes as are named 
therein were rendered ineligible by reason of such 
participation.” Thus, it was Section 3 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself that had “imposed” disabilities, rather 
than merely outlined them for maximum Constitutional 
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clarity. As a result, Johnson’s Proclamation 170 pardons of 
July 4, 1868 under the executive freedom of pardon 
reaffirmed under United States v. Klein became needlessly 
complicated, rendered meaningless in the face of an 
amendment that had defined punishment for a crime that had 
not even existed until its ratification. A writer for the 
Georgia Weekly Telegraph would respond some five days 
later on March 19, 1872, writing that although the author for 
The New York World held an argument that “seems 
conclusive,” it was nonetheless one without pragmatic 
worth. “Congress will not acknowledge it, and the precise 
point is yet to be passed upon by the Federal courts.” It 
would not do, he cautioned, to lose oneself in theory at a time 
when the nation so desperately required level-mindedness.14  
 The same Georgia Weekly Telegraph journalist 
continued on to provide one of the most vitriolic 
condemnations of the Drake proviso to the General 
Appropriations Act of 1870. The proviso was a spiteful 
example of postwar federal legislation, he raged, that 
                                                 
14 The New York World, “Does the Fourteenth Amendment 
Disqualify Anybody?” March 9, 1872. Reprinted under the same 
title in The Atlanta Daily Sun, March 14, 1872; “14th 
Amendment,” accessed via Legal Information Institute, Cornell 
University Law School. 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxiv; 
Andrew Johnson, “Proclamation 170, Granting Pardon to All 
Persons Participating in the Late Rebellion Except Those Under 
Indictment for Treason or Other Felony,” 1868. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=72270; 
Georgia Weekly Telegraph, “An Interesting if not a Practical 
Question,” March 19, 1872. 
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attempted to “convert into poison and venom, a 
constitutional act of Executive benignity.” This 
Congressional design to corrupt a “generous and merciful 
offer of pardon was the lowest example of legislative 
retribution for the late rebellion,” the author continued. 
There was no doubt in his mind that “the case is clear 
enough” and it would only be proper that the United States 
Supreme Court would stand in line with the executive 
platform of official magnanimity, ruling in favor of the 
deceased Victor F. Wilson. In agreement with him was a 
reporter for the New York Herald on January 30, 1872 who 
railed that “To repeal [the presidential pardon by way of the 
Drake proviso] would be a breach of faith not less cruel and 
astounding than to abandon the freed people whom the 
Executive had promised to maintain in their freedom.” Once 
again, a newspaper writer invoked enslavement and freedom 
to legitimize his argument, appealing to the kindly 
sentiments of his readers.15 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Klein has had an impressively resounding and varied legal 
legacy. Although the case’s origins lay in a convoluted Civil 
War property dispute, its utility in debates far removed from 
its beginnings has been undeniable. In the 1980 United 
                                                 
15 The New York Herald, “United States Supreme Court: 
Important Decision Based Upon the Drake Amendment of the 
Appropriation Act of 1863–An Appeal to the Court of Claims by 
the Administrator to the Estate of a Pardoned Rebel–Congress 
and the Judiciary at Variance–The Chief Justice Claims Full 
Jurisdiction and Orders the Property to be Returned to the 
Suitor,” January 30, 1872. 
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States v. Sioux State of Indians Black Hills claim, a Sioux 
Nation push for compensation for federal seizure of their 
ancestral lands stagnated in a quagmire of red tape. In the 
case, a 1978 res judicata waiver served as the 1871 
Congressional Drake proviso had in United States v. Klein, 
complicating the court’s decision.16 Suspicions arose that the 
waiver was an attempt to overrule a 1942 Court of Claims 
decision in the Black Hills claim—a flagrant violation of the 
separation of powers if true. In the Black Hills case, Justice 
Harry Blackmun ultimately decided that holdings in United 
States v. Klein did not apply to the Black Hills discussion; 
the res judicata waiver lacked unconstitutional intent to 
dictate the judicial branch’s decision, and it had liberating—
rather than restrictive—effects on adjudication.17  
Former president William Clinton made reference to 
United States v. Klein is his 2001 New York Times op-ed 
piece “My Reasons for the Pardons.” In the article, he 
defended certain pardons and commutations among the 140 
and 36 he respectively made at the end of his presidency on 
January 20, 2001. Among those released were Marc Rich 
and Pincus Green, originally indicted in 1983 for 
racketeering and fraud. By harkening back to United States 
                                                 
16 Res judicata: “the thing has been judged,” meaning the issue 
before the court has already been decided by another court, 
between the same parties. Therefore, the court will dismiss the 
case before it as being useless. <Dictionary.Law.com> 
17 Edward Lazarus, “The Highest Court in the Land” in Black 
Hills White Justice: The Sioux Nation versus the United States, 
1775 to the Present (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
1999), 394-396. 
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v. Klein, Clinton likely sought to legitimize his actions, 
reminding readers of the freedom that the case had granted 
presidents to pardon whom they chose and as they saw fit. 
United States v. Klein would make a prominent appearance 
again in 2008 with the legal debate Exxon Mobil 
Corporation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, in 
which a dense legal tangle arose surrounding the Trans 
Alaska Pipeline System allowed by Congress in the Trans 
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1651. In the 
end it was concluded that the decision in United States v. 
Klein had no relevancy in “the administrative context, much 
less [in] an administrative ratemaking proceeding” as Klein 
only applied to entities invested with judicial power. 18 
 Writings on the United States v. Klein decision have 
sprung up just as richly in the world of academia. These 
more recent analyses of the case have often been conducted 
from a background of legal training, however, focusing on 
the case’s utility in determining the outcome of modern court 
rulings rather than on the historical significance of United 
States v. Klein. Some, such as Martin H. Redish and 
Christopher R. Pudelski—professor of Law and Public 
Policy and law clerk, respectively—have made efforts to 
defend a political theoretical reading of the case that some 
have argued blows its true impact out of proportion, making 
a grand judicial gesture of reinforcing the separation of 
                                                 
18 William Jefferson Clinton, “My Reasons for the Pardons,” 
New York Times, February 18, 2001; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
FERC, 571 F.3d 1208 (DC Cir. 2009). 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/08-
212_bio_petro.pdf. 
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powers out of what is merely a “relatively brief and cryptic 
post-Civil War decision.” Others have analyzed United 
States v. Klein in the shadow of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008), which established official 
procedure for “authorizing certain acquisitions of foreign 
intelligence,” including offering retroactive immunity by 
providing “standards and procedures for liability protection 
for electronic communication service providers who assisted 
the Government between September 11, 2001 and January 
17, 2007, when the President's Terrorist Surveillance 
Program was brought under the FISA Court.” One such 
scholar is Utah Law Review editor Nate Olsen, who stressed 
in 2009 that the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 “is simply 
bad law” because it “relies on a power Congress lacks,” a 
conclusion that he reaches using United States v. Klein as 
precedent for the restriction of Congressional hegemony.19 
In two articles by Associate Professor of Law 
Howard M. Wasserman of the Florida International 
                                                 
19 Martin H. Redish and Christopher R. Pudelski, “Legislative 
Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: 
Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein,” 
Northwestern University Law Review 100, no. 1 (2006): 437-
464; Redish and Pudelski, 463; FISA Amendments Act of 2008. 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr6304/text; Office 
of Senator Kit Bond, “FISA Amendments Act of 2008,” The 
Wall Street Journal, June 19, 2008. http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB121391360949290049; Nate Olsen, “Congress and the Court: 
Retroactive Immunity in the FISA Amendments Act and the 
Problem of United States v. Klein,” Utah Law Review 1353 
(2009): 1-20; Olsen, 7. 
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University College of Law, Wasserman further explores the 
value of the case in post-9/11 judicial hearings. There is a 
certain cult of Klein, argues Wasserman, which is largely 
unsubstantiated. In general, he asserts, the case “does little 
or no work, certainly not in non-pathological times.” The 
case’s true efficacy, Wasserman states, is instead in its 
historical role in “curbing the worst legislative excess,” a 
crucial one as he notes that “Congress (or at least individual 
members of Congress) may be willing to vote in favor of 
unconstitutional legislation, [especially] in pathological 
times, where the ordinary restraints are removed.” In the 
post-9/11 political climate of frenetic homeland security 
measures such as the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Wasserman argues, United States v. Klein’s tempering of 
Congressional profusion is instrumental.20 
Gordon Young likewise looked askance at hasty 
references made to United States v. Klein in his 1981 article 
“Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction 
and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited.” In it, he 
made reference to past cases and situations that had “invoked 
[Klein] for propositions on which it has little bearing other 
than its establishment of the legitimacy of an inquiry into 
Congress’ [sic] abuse of its power to regulate the federal 
                                                 
20 Howard M. Wasserman, “The Irrepressible Myth of Klein,” 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 79 (2010): 53-96; Howard 
M. Wasserman, “Constitutional Pathology, the War on Terror, 
and United States v. Klein,” Journal of National Security Law 
and Policy 5 (2011): 211-235; Wasserman, “The Irrepressible 
Myth of Klein,” 96; Wasserman, “Constitutional Pathology, the 
War on Terror, and United States v. Klein,” 234-235. 
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courts.” For instance, he outlined, the case had negligible 
relevance to contemporary cases involving busing, abortion, 
school prayers, and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. Young 
even went so far as to liken United States v. Klein to the 
“unfortunate guests” of Procrustes, stretched mercilessly 
without reflection or remorse.21 
 For the American people, their four-year civil war 
would be the reaper of some 750,000 souls. 22 The conflict 
would rend the nation with violence and loss. By its end, it 
would remain for those who had survived to piece back 
                                                 
21 “Procrustes had an iron bed (or, according to some accounts, 
two beds) on which he compelled his victims to lie. Here, if a 
victim was shorter than the bed, he stretched him by hammering 
or racking the body to fit. Alternatively, if the victim was longer 
than the bed, he cut off the legs to make the body fit the bed’s 
length. In either event the victim died. Ultimately Procrustes was 
slain by his own method by the young Attic hero Theseus. . .” 
Encyclopædia Britannica Online, “Procrustes: Greek 
mythological figure.” 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Procrustes. 
Gordon G. Young, “Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ 
Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited,” 
Wisconsin Law Review 1189 (1981): 1189-1262; Young, 
“Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and 
Processes,” 1261. 
22 This 750,000 statistic reflects historian J. David Hecker’s 
recent scholarship on the casualty figures of the Civil War, 
which utilized 1860 and 1870 census data to project how United 
States demographics might have appeared had the war not taken 
such a deadly toll. J. David Hacker, “Recounting the Dead,” The 
New York Times, Opinionator, 20 September 2011. 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/recounting-the-
dead/. 
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together that which had been so viciously torn apart in the 
struggle for Union and freedom. Not unlike the endless 
heaps of horsehair used by army surgeons to suture closed 
the gaping wounds of those physically ravaged by the war, 
it would be postwar rulings and legislation that would stitch 
the war-torn nation back together after the guns fell silent in 
1865. For decades the citizenry of the United States would 
continue to negotiate a peace that was in many ways more 
complicated than the violence which had preceded it. The 
Supreme Court case United States v. Klein would function 
as but a single step in the intricate process of mending the 
nation. Even so, its role was a crucial one, helping to define 
the utility and limits of executive magnanimity, reassert 
presidential power, and further highlight both the divides 
and intersections between the three branches of American 
government. In the aging colossal legal apparatus of the 
post-Civil War era, an unconsidered cog labeled United 
States v. Klein labors on. 
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